The Brooklyn Rail

Russia’s brutal assault on Ukraine and the deeply authoritarian nature of its current government have led many in the international left to line up behind the somewhat less authoritarian Ukrainian state, effectively supporting a “national defense” that has already claimed the lives of tens of thousands of Ukrainian men and women. In line with the current wave of identity politics, this stance is often portrayed as the default position of leftists and feminists in Eastern Europe, who are constantly faced with the threat of ending up under Putin’s boots; accordingly, those who refuse to take sides are denounced as arrogant Western leftists who simply don’t understand what’s at stake.

Born in Moscow in 1982, but living in Germany for many years, Ewgeniy Kasakow is a rare voice undermining this simplistic picture. In his widely discussed book Spezialoperation und Frieden: Die russische Linke gegen den Krieg [Special Operation and Peace: The Russian Left against the War], he documents voices from Russia in opposition to the current war—some of them supporting Ukraine’s “national defense,” some not. We met in Berlin in December 2024.

Felix Baum (Rail): Let’s start with the reasons for the war. Leaving aside those who parrot Russian propaganda about a “fascist coup” allegedly taking place in Ukraine in 2014, followed by “genocide” against the Russian-speaking population, the left broadly offers three interpretations. Some see Putin as driven by a pan-Russian nationalist ideology, which could lead to genocide against Ukrainians in the worst-case scenario. Others argue that he perceives the relative liberalization in Ukraine since 2014 as a threat to his authoritarian rule. Finally, many see more geopolitical motives: Ukraine’s orientation towards the West, including its declared intention to join the EU and NATO, was seen as unacceptable by the Kremlin. Which reading do you find most accurate?

Ewgeniy Kasakow: Let’s try to bring some order to this: Putin is the head of a capitalist state. Nationalism is not merely his ideology or worldview; it’s his profession. Just like his colleagues in other countries and his enemies in the war, he acts for the advancement of the state he governs in the global competition. The official nationalism of Putin’s Russia cannot be described as “ethno-nationalist,” meaning racially or biologically based, aimed at ethnic homogeneity. On the contrary, under Putin, Russia is defined and presented as a multi-ethnic empire. There is also an explicitly anti-imperial ethno-nationalism, but its adherents—who want to see Russia as a nation-state for ethnic Russians—are often opposed to Putin and support Ukraine. A genocide against Ukrainians, i.e., their physical extermination based on their belonging to a particular nation or ethnicity, is difficult to conceive within the official paradigm, as the differences between Russians and Ukrainians, in the spirit of late Tsarist Russia, are officially denied.

The fear of “color revolutions,” of an “orange threat,” some kind of “regime change” engineered from abroad, has indeed been a constant concern throughout Putin’s rule. However, the events in Ukraine do not directly threaten his rule in Russia. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, there have already been three “revolutions”—that is, unrest following elections that led to changes in government in 2005, 2010, and 2020. These did not provoke a significant response from Russia.

So-called “geopolitics” is a pseudoscience. Explaining ongoing conflicts through geography—portraying current political interests as something determined by the location of states—is an inadequate explanation. Statements like “Ukraine has always held this or that significance for Russia” often illustrate this line of thinking. I would like to move away from such arguments and focus instead on the conflicting interests of today.

Between Russia and the NATO countries, between Russia and the leading EU powers, there are real conflicts of interest. These are not simply caused by Putin’s character, nor by a desire in the West to get even more than it already has. Fundamentally, Russia does not accept that the leading capitalist states set the rules by which it must compete. Russia is a capitalist state—but not an economically particularly successful one. The expansion of the EU, led by Germany and France, deprives the Russian economy of its markets. Russia’s claim to decide independently as a sovereign world power when and where it considers the use of force necessary conflicts with NATO’s claim, led by the United States, to define and enforce the global order of peace.

Rail: Many left-wing analyses argue that Putin sought rapprochement with the West in the early 2000s but was rejected; from this perspective, the escalating conflict between Russia and the NATO bloc could have been avoided through a more “prudent,” conciliatory Western policy. How accurate do you find this assessment?

Kasakow: Yes, I often hear this in Germany, particularly from those who nostalgically look back at the social democracy of the 1960s and ’70s. They then ask why things couldn’t have unfolded like the Neue Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt, his “New Eastern Policy.” However, today’s Russia is not the late Soviet Union. It is a capitalist state that aims to compete successfully with Western countries. What would “prudent policy” and “balance” mean in this context? Admission of Russia into NATO? Or a selfless abandoning of the interests of Western capital, i.e. the willingness to forgo access to the resources, labor, and markets of the former Eastern bloc?

This lament—“Why can’t competition be purely peaceful?”—is by the way increasingly criticized in Germany in the name of the national interests of former Soviet “brother states” and the non-Russian republics. The argument is that such a compromise would come at the expense of their interest in becoming NATO members, pursuing the establishment of their own capitalist nation-states.

Rail: You describe the official ideology of Putin’s regime as highly eclectic, mixing anti-Western, anti-colonial rhetoric with its own imperial ambitions, driven by the prospect of further degradation in international competition. Its attempt to become a significant political—and subsequently economic—power through military strength has practically failed according to your account. Is social peace in the country then based on nothing but propaganda and repression, or how does the regime maintain the consent of the working class?

Kasakow: We have to keep in mind: the ideology may be eclectic, but Russia remains a resource-exporting country, and people there understand that they are dependent on Russia continuing to do so. As essentially nationalist-minded people, Russian workers also believe they will be worse off if “their” state loses in this competition.

If we specifically consider the situation after February 24, 2022, the collapse in the Russian economy due to sanctions that was initially feared has not materialized. In the poorest regions, even more money is now being spent due to state compensations for the fallen and injured. The rhetoric that the war and sanctions have benefited the economy can therefore still seem quite convincing for many.

Rail: Your book Spezialoperation und Frieden, published a few months after the war began, attracted considerable interest because you document contributions from the Russian left, with whom the Western left has little contact, partly due to language barriers. I found it very illuminating. Which factions of the left did you examine, and what are the main points of contention? And aren’t we talking here about a left that is, sadly, even more marginalized than the left in most Western countries?

Kasakow: I examined the entire left spectrum—from the anti-war voices in the rather socially conservative yet still self-proclaimed leftist Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), to social democrats, trade unions, left-wing Stalinists (not all those who refer to Stalin positively in today’s Russia identify as left-wing), Trotskyists, anarchists, autonomists, and syndicalists. There’s a chapter on the left wing of feminist and queer movements and one that documents voices from the Russian community in Germany.

As for their influence, no one really knows how many supporters various leftist, liberal, or nationalist movements have in Russia today—it’s nearly impossible to measure, as election results reveal very little about it and surveys are difficult to conduct. And as I describe in the book, there is also a lot of ambiguity within Russian society about what “left” or “right” even means. Asking, “Are you left or right?” in a survey would be pointless.

Of course, the radical left gives little reason for optimism. But if one defines “left” as the position that there should be “more social welfare,” it would actually have more supporters than in some Western countries. For this reason, the liberal opposition fears that if there was free competition for power, a party like the KPRF might actually win.

The most important points of contention since February 2022 have, of course, first of all centered on the reasons for the war. For liberals, it’s simple: there are rules according to which states engage in competition, and Putin broke these rules. Radical leftists, however, don’t see this as a sufficient explanation. There is a widespread notion that wars exist because they benefit capital or individual capitalists. But many capitalists, both in Russia and the West—not to mention Ukraine—were quite unhappy with the outbreak of this war. A tremendous amount of wealth is destroyed in war, and capitalists suffer from sanctions and the loss of markets.

For Leninist currents, the bourgeois state is a dictatorship of capitalists, a power unrestricted by any legal limitations. Capitalists, in this view, do whatever they want, and what they want is driven by economic motives. Marx, by contrast, described the state as the “ideal collective capitalist,” which is distinct from any individual capitalist or even a group of them. The bourgeois state secures spheres of influence for its national capital in other regions and represents its interests in negotiations over the conditions of trade and investment. Such negotiations involve threats, and to make threats, a state needs military power. In its domestic policies, the bourgeois state limits competition to ensure its stability. Thus, it often acts against the interests of individual capitalists.

There is also a “politicist” approach, which suggests that Putin invaded Ukraine to secure his power. But in 2022, his power was stable and consolidated; no opposition or protest movement posed any serious threat to him.

The second major debate concerns the theory of imperialism. Is Russia an imperialist state? Not in the sense that bourgeois or anarchist media use the term—meaning anyone who attacks others is imperialist. The question is whether Russian capitalism has reached a sufficiently high level of strength and development in order to qualify as imperialist. If not, as pro-Russian factions emphasize, is Russia then fighting an anti-imperialist war? And if one follows Lenin in distinguishing between oppressed and oppressing nationalism, then who is fighting a “national liberation struggle”? Ukraine against Russia? Or Russia against the West? Or is this framework entirely misplaced?

Economically, Russia is definitely weaker than NATO states or China. Its claim to global power status comes not from successful capital accumulation but from military potential and resources, which genuinely successful capitalist states need for their economies. Yet the Russian leadership leaves no doubt that its goal is for Russia to become a real capitalist world power.

The third major point of contention is the nature of Putin’s regime and the current Russian state. Some now describe it as “fascist.” Others point out that many essential characteristics of fascism are missing: a mass movement, mass mobilization, a unified ideology, and comprehensive—rather than merely selective—repression. However, people also note that right-wing extremist positions are becoming increasingly prevalent in public discourse, the state collaborates with many far-right structures, and several right-wing activists have access to weapons and training. War veterans, the “hardline” opposition dissatisfied with how the war is conducted, and those who believe the propaganda more than its creators could all form the basis of future right-wing movements that are even more radical than Putin’s current project.

Rail: You write that an exclusive focus on anti-war protests in the streets—which did exist in Russia in 2022 but were harshly suppressed—is a mistake, as other forms of resistance are at least equally important, such as creating alternative media, supporting deserters, or engaging in sabotage, like the numerous arson attacks on military facilities. How has resistance in Russia evolved since the publication of your book? Do you see any chance that it could gain more strength as war-weariness grows, or does sheer repression prevent this?

Kasakow: Resistance adapts to new conditions. Of course, there are those who are willing to risk everything in the present moment for a single act, such as sabotaging electrical boxes on railways. Others prefer to focus their energy on building structures, agitation, and networking. For instance, there’s a new party—the Russian Communist Party (Internationalists)—that deliberately avoids official registration, knowing it would only lead to repression. Everyone anticipates that the current system cannot be maintained when some day, for whatever reason, Vladimir Putin is no longer able to govern Russia.

There’s also debate over the extent to which collaboration with the liberal opposition is feasible. One faction of the liberals is trying to get parts of Putin’s elites to break away from him, while Alexei Navalny’s followers are more radical in declaring the Yeltsin years as the root of today’s Putinism. In this regard, they agree with the left, though their goals are, of course, different.

Rail: Since February 2022, the left pretty much everywhere has been practically divided into pro-Russian, pro-Ukrainian, and anti-nationalist/defeatist factions. You are critical not only of Putin’s supporters but also of those who, for various reasons, call for military defense of Ukraine and sometimes even support it practically—a position that extends well into anarchist milieus. At the same time, you argue that such voices, especially from Ukraine, should be taken seriously, and while you don’t include the pro-Russian faction in your book, you document such contributions. What criticism do you have of these leftists, and why do you still find them more worthy of discussion than the pro-Russian faction?

Kasakow: The book focuses on leftists in the anti-war movement. In Russia, the term “anti-war movement” encompasses both those who oppose both warring parties and those who support Ukraine’s victory. Just as in the US the term “anti-Vietnam War movement” was used for pacifists, advocates of non-intervention, and fervent Viet Cong supporters. The book was published by a somewhat anarchist press, so the arguments of pro-Russian leftists—who tend to be Stalinist or social-democratic—were of less interest.

In leftist circles in Germany and Russia, the arguments of those Ukrainian leftists who call for national defense are often presented within a discourse of empathy as “authentic voices of the oppressed.” But taking them seriously cannot mean that we simply accept their judgments, as they are the ones who are “immediately concerned” by the war; it can only mean that we critically engage with their line of thought.

Some leftists forget all the critiques they may have had of state and capital, nationalism, and democracy (if they ever held such views at all). They say, “It’s about Ukraine’s survival”—survival, mind you, as a sovereign bourgeois state, the survival of Ukrainians as a nation! Out of empathy with the population, they end up supporting the state. But it’s not the state that defends the people; it’s the people who are forced to risk their lives for the state!

For many leftists, opposing Putin is about defending the possibility of continuing their “activism” with some measure of safety. For the kind of activism that in Germany might earn someone a scholarship or eventually even a professorship in some “intersectional studies” program, one faces prison in Russia. But to say, “We prefer a Western victory so that we can comfortably criticize the West and make a living from it”—I’m not so sure that that is a convincing position. Too many leftists are willing to abandon their critique for the sake of a lesser evil.

Rail: You advance an anti-national position that does not take sides in the war. As you yourself write, this exposes you to the accusation of ultimately siding with the Russian aggressor. The left-wing advocates of military national defense that I’ve come across argue above all with the different degrees of repression: According to them, it does matter that there are more democratic freedoms in Ukraine—also and especially for leftists, feminists, and workers’ struggles—compared to the draconian repression in Russia. How do you respond to this objection?

Kasakow: It depends in which country and with whom you are discussing. For the pro-Russian faction, this position makes me a denier of “NATO fascism.” The question is not whether Ukraine will become more like Russia or more like Great Britain, France, or Germany. Russia and Ukraine will remain countries on the capitalist periphery. Should we then say, “Fine, then let there be more ‘shock therapies,’ as long as the left is allowed to demonstrate against them”?

Rail: Are you aware of any relevant attempts to bring together anti-national, anti-militarist forces in Russia and other Eastern European countries—perhaps even in the West? And what could we as left-wing radicals in the West do in order to work towards an end to the slaughter?

Kasakow: It is of course very difficult to bring together forces from all the countries involved, especially in view of the fact that there are representatives of very different left-wing currents who are not taking sides in this war and are opposing it. On the one hand, the organizers of the Zimmerwald Conference during World War I, which is repeatedly invoked, had it easier: They came from large organizations, could refer to their resolutions passed before the war (of course, it was of little use), and also knew whom to contact in which country. On the other hand, many of them were in a minority in their organizations and branded as traitors.

Today, radical leftists often do not even know who in their city still holds similar positions; hardly any organization can seriously disrupt the government's war efforts simply by mobilizing its own supporters. Several meetings were held independently of each other in the first year of the war. In 2023 there was a call to hold a kind of new Zimmerwald conference, but after October 7, it became clear that many groups that refuse to take sides in the Ukraine conflict are taking a completely different line in the Middle East conflict.

As far as I know, there was a hybrid meeting in March where left and council communists, anti-national Marxists, and anarcho-syndicalists from several countries were present—the format was a discussion about the causes of the war and this process is to be continued. In May, there was a “Week of Action” against capitalist wars and capitalist peace in Prague, but there were organizational problems and frictions. Nevertheless, many groups and people from countries beyond the European continent got to know each other. At the beginning of November, a meeting of leftists from post-Soviet countries took place in Cologne, where about seventy people from Russia, Ukraine, and other countries had a discussion, but there was no agreement between the faction that advocates an immediate end to the war and those who argue that “Ukraine should decide for itself whether to fight or negotiate.”

But whether there is formal networking or not: there are positions that deserve to be discussed more widely. The Confederation of Revolutionary Anarcho-Syndicalists (KRAS) and Union of Marxists from Russia, the group “Assembly” from Kharkiv in Ukraine, groups like Critisticuffs or Communist Workers’ Organization in UK, magazines like Kosmoprolet, Konkret, GegenStandpunkt in Germany or Antipolitika , which circulates in several Balkan countries, sections of the International Communist Current—these are just a few examples.